INTRODUCTION
The judiciary's proper role in our democracy is a constant subject of debate among legal academics and citizens alike. When does interpreting the law cross the line into creating law?
When decisions are reached through democratic means, some people will inevitably be disappointed with the results. But those whose views do not prevail will at least know they had their say, and accordingly are-in the tradition of our political culture-reconciled to the result of a fair and honest debate. In addition, they can gear up to raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on the winning side to think again. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work. . . . By deciding the question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. 1 While Obergefell and Friedrichs are similar in that they arguably intrude on the democratic process, there is one sizable distinction: Obergefell shut down the political process in regards to same-sex marriage, but Friedrichs will not completely foreclose the democratic realm at the state level. Instead, closing the debate on agency fees need not close minds for union supporters-it could open minds to creative solutions.
This Note suggests one legally permissible legislative response available to pro-union states if Friedrichs is decided adversely: eliminate the duty of fair representation and do away with union exclusivity to allow members-only bargaining. Currently, public-sector unions with collective-bargaining power are obligated to receive majority support from the bargaining unit, in which case the union is named the exclusive bargaining agent. In exchange for this exclusivity the union must represent all employees-members and non-members alike. While eliminating this historically rooted obligation seems extreme in the context of American labor law, it has merit. Under a members-only system, union dissenters could truly be "non union," union supporters would no longer subsidize non-members, and unions would be in a position to show their value like never before.
Part II of this Note briefly outlines the role of unions in America, both historically and today, with section II.A tracing the rise and fall of unions as a prominent feature of our labor environment; section II.B describing union security provisions; and section III.C outlining precedent supporting such security arrangements. Part III dissects the pending threat to this status quo, as section III.A attempts to decipher the clues dropped by the Court's conservative bloc over the past several years; section III.B introduces Friedrichs; and section III.C forecasts the impact an adverse decision would have on public-sector unions. Lastly, Part IV presents members-only bargaining as an option available to states leery of a traditional right-to-work system, with section IV.A describing the model; section IV.B suggesting the model is a viable option given its historical and current use both in the United States and abroad; and section IV.C weighing the pros and cons of members-only collective bargaining in the public sector.
II. THE STATUS QUO FOR UNIONS
The Court's forthcoming Friedrichs decision is arguably the headliner in a 2015-2016
Term characterized by many as even more politicized than usual. Other politically charged issues on the docket include abortion, redistricting, affirmative action, and religious exemptions to the Affordable Care Act. 8 President Barack Obama, Speech at Milwaukee Laborfest (Sept. 1, 2014) (partial transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/06/president-obama-labor-day-fight-americas-workers-continues); see also Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech in Cadillac Square, Detroit, MI. (Sept. 5, 1960) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60408) ("For the labor movement is people. Our unions have brought millions of men and women together, made them members one of another, and given them common tools for common goals. Their goals are goals for all America-and their enemies are the enemies of all progress."). 9 Scott Bauer, Fierce Response to Walker Plan to Bar Federal Public Unions, AP (Sept. 14, 2015, 9:18 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9608f343fcae476db6fbe89238b2f3c7/ap-exclusive-gops-walker-proposes-vast-unionrestrictions; see also infra note 12 (discussing early opposition to public-sector unions from left-wing politicians and unions themselves). The bases for this argument are the purported effects public-sector unions have on local budgets. Cities like Detroit and San José exemplify the extent to which public-sector pension plans strain municipal budgets and, in extreme situations, lead to cities filing for bankruptcy protection. 14 This heavy unionization produced leverage, which led to gains for unionized employees that can still be seen today. 15 At some point, however, things began to change. First, union membership began to decline in the aggregate-in 2014, only 11.1% of workers, or 14.6 million individuals, belonged to a union.
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The precise causes of this decline are unknown, but likely stem from manufacturers' decisions to outsource traditional union jobs and anti-organized labor sentiment from big business. Second, the prototypical union member changed-in 2009, public-sector union membership surpassed private-sector membership for the first time.
17
Today, teachers comprise some of the largest, strongest unions in the country-the National Education Association has 3.2 million active members 18 and the American Federation of Teachers has over 1.6 million members. 19 Much like what happened in the private sector, however, public-sector unions are now under attack; 20 teachers' organizations are in danger of losing members, losing funds, and thus losing power. 21 But, as discussed in the next section, these unions have both the duty of fair representation and, in non-right-to-work states the right to extract fair-share fees. These principles work together to preserve high membership rates, the union purse, and organizational power-for now.
B. The Duty of Fair Representation and Union Security Provisions
The legal status quo imposes a burdensome obligation on majority unions, but in twentyfive states 22 it also provides them with a useful mechanism to cope with its obligation. First, unions have a duty of fair representation given their exclusive status; in practice, this means an elected union must represent everyone in the bargaining unit-members and non-members alike. 23 This duty first developed in the private sector as a byproduct of the Railway Labor Act To offset this duty of fair representation, unions are sometimes able to rely on union security provisions. Put generally, these arrangements consist of "an agreement between a union and an employer that the employer will require all employees to undertake some specified level of union support as a condition of employment." 29 These provisions condition employment on some level of involvement with unions.
Historically, these arrangements existed on a continuum with varying levels of support required. Most demanding were closed-shop provisions, where the employer hires only union 20140710-story.html ("In every state, workers who want to collectively bargain with an employer must get support from a majority of the workers in a unit . . . . When the union gets majority support, it has a legal duty to bargain on behalf of all the workers in the unit, including those who object to the union. . . . This is the so-called rule of exclusive representation, and it applies everywhere in the country."). 24 See generally 45 U.S.C. § § § 151-165 (1996 
III. THE ATTACK ON PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
After Abood, the general constitutionality of fair-share provisions appeared settled. The decision was not a Teflon shield for agency fees, however. Abood did not remove the issue from the democratic realm, as states remained free to curb public-sector collective bargaining through right-to-work laws. Additionally, and more relevant here, Abood left ambiguities that have allowed the Court to revisit its holding over the past several years. These legislative and judicial attacks threaten the continued collection of agency fees-and thus the union purse-but it is unclear whether unions fears will materialize, let alone whether it will cause the dastardly impact many anticipate. This Part speculates both as to the likely result and potential impact of 
A. The Building Threat to Public-Sector Unions
Union opponents have been chipping away at union security arrangements for some time.
Even before Abood, nineteen states already had right-to-work legislation on the books. Right-to-Work Resources, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). Florida was the first to pass such a law in 1943. Id. Right-to-work systems create two classes of workers: dues-paying members and non-members. The union is legally obligated to represent both classes equally. Compare this to the employee classes in agency-fee environments, discussed supra note 31. 41 Id. Ten of these states have included the right to work on their state constitutions, much like was the case for Nebraska in Hanson. Interestingly, individual counties have begun to enter the fray. For example, the Republicanled Kentucky Senate passes a right-to-work bill every year, only for the Democrat-led House to reject it. 49 Harris involved a group of personal assistants' challenge to agency fees. Id. The clear victors were thus personal assistants both in Illinois and across the nation. Other quasi-public employees-e.g., government-funded daycare providers-are also likely winners, although courts will struggle to define who qualifies as a quasi-public employee. Conversely, the obvious losers are unions who can no longer collect dues from nonmembers in these sectors. 50 Id. at 2631. 51 Id. at 2639-40. 52 Commentators have noticed a pattern develop during Chief Justice Roberts' tenure: while the Court rarely explicitly overturns cases, it lays the foundation in an initial case and then uses it as support to wholly overturn it in is not simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to the benefit of 'free-riding' nonmemers; private speech often furtherse the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for. What is distinctive, however, about the 'free riders' who are nonunion members of the union's own bargaining unit is that in some respects they are free riders whom the law requires the union to carry-indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit, even at the expense of its other interests."). To push back on back on this point a bit, it is worth noting that Abood did not create a union right to collect fair-share payments, rather it did not declare them unconstitutional. Thus to say "the union grew powerful before the fair share" is perhaps misleading since public-sector unions grew before Abood in a labor environment that allowed fair-share provisions-at least in non-right-to-work states. 69 Our Members, supra note 18; AM. FED. OF TEACHERS, supra note 19.
NEA. 70 The current opt-out regime for union dues allows teachers to withdraw contributions for their union's political arm, but few do so-for example, only 90,000 NEA members-less than three percent-decline to pay full dues. 71 Losing partial fees from 90,000 members nationwide would certainly not destroy union strength.
Lastly, unions will not go quietly into the night, even if Friedrichs makes life difficult. A majority of literature discussing a post-agency-fee world focuses on internal efforts already being employed by unions. The NEA and AFT have embarked on massive recruiting drives "to convince workers of unions' relevance," and it seems to be working-the AFT reported it has gained 140,000 full members since the beginning of 2014. full members does not mean they will not be tempted to fully withdraw when given the option to do so. 81 The opportunity to save a considerable amount of money 82 and free ride off a union that is obligated to collectively bargain on your behalf is enticing, even for those not politically opposed to public-sector collective bargaining.
IV. REPLACING THE FAIR-SHARE WITH FAIRNESS
Should the first domino fall in Freidrichs, states should at least consider a drastic step:
taking away the ticket to free ride. One way to do this is for states to get rid of exclusivity and fair representation, 83 instead allowing-perhaps even encouraging or requiring 84 -state curbing-public-sector-unions-silence-teachers-voices-381233 ("Interestingly, in 1995, Indiana eliminated the right of teachers unions to charge agency fees to non-members. Although the state's major NEA-affiliate (ISTA) did not grow rapidly in the decade that followed agency fee elimination, neither did it see its membership disappear."); BLS Report, supra note 15 (showing 31.6% of federal employees are union members, on par with state public employee membership, despite the federal government being a right-to-work environment). 80 Moberg, supra note 68. 81 See, e.g., Mahoney supra note 71 ("Losing those 90,000 [non-member, agency-fee payers in California] wouldn't crush the union. But a decision freeing members from paying dues could tempt many others to leave it."); Jamieson, supra note 72. 15, 2015) , http://prospect.org/article/labor-crossroads-defense-membersonly-unionism ("[U]nion opponents will argue that members-only bargaining is the only permissible form of union representation and the law should abandon the principle of exclusive representation when a majority chooses a union. Given the lack of experience that unions, employers, and workers have with members-only unionism-at least in the modern context-a permissive and experimental approach is appropriate."). 84 What level of involvement public employers must have with minority unions may well vary from state to state, and is beyond the scope of this Note. Options may include requiring governments to enter agreements with minority unions, simply allowing governments to do so, or anything in-between. Given that this Note applies most to nonright-to-work states, a type of "good faith" requirement to negotiate is most likely to preserve union strength in light of an adverse decision in Friedrichs.
employers to collectively bargain with members-only unions on various issues. 85 The burden of fair representation has been largely offset in non-right-to-work states by allowing unions to collect fair-share fees; if the Court takes away a union's power to collect such dues then the natural-yet bold-response would seem to be removing the counterbalance by lifting the burden of fair representation. The system of exclusivity and fair representation is so entrenched in America's labor environment that it is rarely questioned and alternative options are rarely considered, but this Note aims to do just that.
A. Doing Away with Exclusivity and the Duty of Fair Representation
The general premise of this proposal is relatively simple: 86 A union would only represent its dues-paying members. Dissenting employees "would have a right to be genuinely nonunion:
They wouldn't be subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, they wouldn't have to interact with their employer through a collective agent, and they wouldn't be required to pay anything to a union they didn't vote for." 87 Members would not subsidize non-members since unions would bargain only on behalf of those who pay union dues.
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To illustrate, imagine a high school math teacher in California. 89 For any number of reasons, this teacher is opposed to the teachers' union. 90 Consider the following three scenarios: 85 Collective bargaining is broken into mandatory topics of and permissible topics of bargaining; these topics vary from state to state. See Teacher's Unions and Collective Bargaining: Resolving Conflicts, THOMSON REUTERS, http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teacher-s-unions-and-collective-bargaining-resolving-conflicts.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). Thus states could require, allow, or not permit members-only unions and states to negotiate over certain issues like wages, hours, insurance coverage, or conditions of employment. 86 Members-only bargaining for public-sector employees would not be "simple" in practice, as there are many possible nuances, see supra notes 83-85, and practical problems without an obvious solution, see infra subsection IV.C.2. 87 Sachs & Fisk, supra note 23. 88 See Fisk, supra note 83. 89 As the source for the Friedrichs challenge, California is a right-to-work state that requires non-union members to pay fair-share fees to the teachers' union. 90 The Friedrichs challenge is properly focused on dissenters who are concerned with the political undertones of forced union support. There are, however, other reasons a teacher may reasonably be opposed to unions and collective representation-maybe the teacher is new, so paying union dues and massive student loans seems
(1) The union may exact fair-share payments to the cover the teacher's share of collective-bargaining costs, say $1,000 per year. The union has a duty to represent the teacher even though she is not a full union member. The teacher and school district are thus bound by the collective-bargaining agreement in regards to the terms and conditions of the teacher's employment. (2) The teacher is not required to pay her agency fees, and thus could save $1,000 per year in forced dues. Nonetheless, the union still has a duty to represent the teacher, and the teacher is still bound by whatever contract the union negotiates with the school district. (3) The union does not bargain on the teacher's behalf if she declines to pay whatever dues the union charges. The teacher has essentially three options: she could negotiate on her own behalf; she may join a different teachers' union that she finds more appealing; or, if she decides neither of those options are desirable, she is still free to loosen her convictions-and her wallet-and join the majority union and pay required dues.
Of these three options, states and unions commonly employ only the first two at the moment.
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The first option, allowing agency-fees, is how labor works in a state satisfied with Abood; 92 the second option, disallowing agency-fees, exists in right-to-work states and would be the 
B. The Viability of Member-Only Collective Bargaining
impossible on a new-teacher salary; perhaps the teacher is incredibly successful and believes she would be worth more on the open market; the list goes on. 91 As discussed below, see infra section IV.B, some states do allow members-only collective bargaining in the private sector, public sector, or both. 92 This is the Friedrichs plaintiffs' situation. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 93 See supra 40 and accompanying text. 94 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). 95 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 96 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 97 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Removing the duty of fair representation and eliminating exclusivity may seem ill advised, perhaps even unworkable to those familiar with American labor. But there is evidence-from the United States and abroad, historically and contemporarily-that such a system is in fact viable. The first indication this proposal could work comes from other nations.
Indeed, "[T]he overwhelming majority of industrial countries reject exclusive representation, and most of them have much higher union density rates than the United States . . . ." 98 The oft-cited examples for members-only bargaining are New Zealand and Australia, 99 but the same is true in most European countries. 100 The success of organized labor in these countries demonstrates there are feasible alternatives to our labor system, as unnatural as they may seem. This is not surprising, since members-only unions are sometimes the only option in these states given the increased difficulty of obtaining exclusive status as compared to non-right-to-work states. It is worth noting, however, that an adverse decision in Friedrichs is unlikely to be the catalyst that pushes other right-to-work states to pass legislation friendly to members-only unions since Friedrichs will have no effect in these states;
rather Friedrichs could spur non-right-to-work states to consider promoting the growth and increasing the strength of members-only unions, therefore bucking this pattern.
Second, while there are private-sector members-only unions, 108 most consist of publicsector workers. 109 In fact, the AFT represents 120,000 employees that belong to unions that provide members-only benefits in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 110 As Moshe and Schrievner point out this pattern is linked to the fact most members-only unions currently exist in right-to-work states; states opposed to organized labor can more easily limit publicsector collective bargaining rights, so members-only unions are unlikely to accomplish much.
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The Texas Workers Alliance represents non-teaching staff (e.g., custodians, secretaries, bus drivers) in San Antonio, Texas, and exemplifies a public-sector members-only union.
112
Texas law prohibits public-sector unions from negotiating over wages, hours, or conditions of employment, however, so obtaining a majority is difficult. 113 With no elected representative the door is left open for non-exclusive unions to provide members-only benefits like occupational insurance and legal services.
Nebraska takes a similar approach by allowing members-only benefits, even for exclusive unions. As a right-to-work state, Nebraska public employees can refrain entirely from paying union dues.
114
Should an employee need legal services, however, it may use the labor organization's services only if it reimburses the union. 115 Nebraska has therefore modified the duty of fair representation for exclusive representatives by granting the benefit of free legal representation in employment-related grievances or legal actions solely to union members. In this sense union membership serves as an insurance policy of sorts, and is a large reason Nebraska teachers' unions enjoy such high membership.
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Given the success of members-only unions abroad-and, to a lesser extent, within the United States-there is reason to think a system based around non-exclusive unions without the duty of fair representation is viable. Being viable is obviously different than being a good idea, though, so the next section attempts to weigh the most obvious pros and cons of this proposal.
C. Is Members-Only Collective Bargaining a Good Idea?
Fast 
i. The Appeal of Members-Only Unions
Members-only bargaining would confer some degree of benefit to everyone involved.
First, union dissenters would get what they seek: independence. Opponents of organized laborlike Ms. Friedrichs-disagree with the idea of public-sector collective bargaining as a whole.
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A win at the Supreme Court would mean Ms. Friedrichs no longer has to financially support her union, but the fact remains she would be involuntarily involved given the duty of fair representation. The approach proposed here would not only mean she can refrain from paying dues, but also that she would not be covered by any union-negotiated contract. Instead she could enlist any representative she wanted to advocate on her behalf or do so herself. Thus a membersonly framework would protect Ms. Friedrichs' First Amendment rights more than any judicial opinion could; it would put the most separation between her and the union she wants no connection with.
Union supporters also have reason to support this proposal. To begin, it would solve the free-rider problem; members would no longer have to subsidize those who are unwilling to pay for whatever services the union provides since only paying members would receive union benefits. Furthermore, this model is likely to increase union efficiency and its receptiveness to the wishes of its constituency. Albert Hirschman's "exit, voice, and loyalty" framework 119 supports this hypothesis-employees' voice will become more powerful since unions will be more concerned about exit than ever before. This is so because true exit has never been a real 118 Friedrichs involves the petitioners' objection to compulsory dues, but such objection is based on the political nature of public-sector collective bargaining as a whole. STATES (1970) . As the name suggests, Hirschman said individuals have three basic options when they are dissatisfied with something: they can leave (exit), they can share their concern in hopes of improvement (voice), with certain factors affecting the cost-benefit analysis of each option (loyalty). Id. threat since it would require union decertification, a rarity. 120 The result of this lack of exit power resulted in an admitted lack of responsiveness to member voice: "'I think we took things 125 Since an individual will be subject to the terms of the bargained contract regardless, it's not really a "benefit" that should enter the equation. Thus the decision ultimately boils down to whether a person is willing to pay the cost of membership-union dues (e.g., $1,000 per year)-to obtain abstract benefits-the hope dues will pay off in better negotiating results or prevent some sort of moral guilt that may come with free riding. 126 Placing financial value on benefits is not always easy since often they are often intangible, but consider the following example: a members-only teachers' union bargains for three additional paid days off (valued at, say, $200 per day) and a superior health care plan (with a $500 lower deductible). An economically rational teacher has reason to join the union provided the fees were below the benefits of membership-she should pay up to $1,099. 127 No doubt there are concerns beyond those briefly discussed here. For instance, removal of those opposed to a union's political activities may prompt the union to engage in the political process even more since there's no need to limit involvement in an effort to build and preserve broad consensus. states impose a requirement that government units bargain in good faith with minority unions.
Another administrative problem would be the enormous reliance interests it would upset.
Second, the lack of one voice could produce negative externalities, especially in the education context. Teachers are the primary benefactors of NEA and AFT lobbying efforts, but students benefit, too. In addition to seeking items that directly benefit teachers like higher wages and better benefits, teachers' unions also push for things related to educational quality like reducing class sizes. 131 The current system of exclusivity helps unions amass enough bargaining power to effectuate positive change in these areas, and progress may be more difficult without a collective voice demanding improvement. This problem is perhaps mitigated by the fact unions already pool their bargaining power in regards to these collective-good issues, so presumably smaller members-only unions could do the same thing.
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Lastly, perhaps a members-only model simply wouldn't further the primary interests involved in Abood, Harris, and Friedrichs-maybe it wouldn't limit free riders or preserve labor peace. 133 Eliminating the duty of fair representation would solve the free-rider problem on the surface. But in light of the administrative difficulty in negotiating numerous contracts for individuals holding the same job, many contracts are prone to become "take-it-or-leave-it" in regards to certain terms. This means gains will be experienced across the board, including by those who didn't pay any union fees. Similarly, unions as a whole could free ride, in a sense. , http://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/nea-and-aft-two-unions-one-voice.html (noting the ways the NEA and AFT aligned their stances in regards to broader educational issues like testing, common core, and teacher licensing). Also worth noting is the unfortunate truth that teachers' unions and student interests are not always aligned. One example of this would be so-called "rubber rooms" in large school districts where tenured teachers are sent if their incapable of being fired and their performance in the classroom is utterly unacceptable. See generally Rubber Rooms, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/rubber-rooms/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) . 133 See generally Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618; Abood, 431 U.S. 209. one organization were more willing to sacrifice individual benefits like wages or sick days in exchange for collective goods like class size, then the non-sacrificing union would presumably benefit even though it did not pay the cost. Furthermore, allowing multiple unions to represent the same group of employees does create the risk of union rivalries and dissension within the work force, implicating the interest in labor peace.
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V. CONCLUSION
This is a pivotal time for unions and labor advocates. In the coming Term, the Supreme Court will decide Friedrichs and re-determine the constitutional validity of fair-share provisions, which allow unions to collect fees from non-members. All indications suggest the Supreme
Court will overturn its precedent-Abood-ruling these provisions constitute compelled political speech and thus violate the First Amendment. Such a holding would effectively create a national right-to-work law for public-sector employees, an area historically reserved for state decision, and unions would undoubtedly suffer. Pro-union states will not be left without democratic recourse should this prediction come true, however. If unions can no longer collect fair-share fees, then eliminating the duty of fair representation would restore fairness and is a logical step worthy of consideration.
